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The Death of
Military Justice
WILLIAM J. GREGOR

B

uried within the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011 was a provision offered by Mr. Patrick Murphy of Pennsylvania to
repeal Section 654 of Title 10 US Code, the so-called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
Policy.”1 Advocates and the American media see the repeal as a minor matter
limited to admitting open homosexuals to military service. On December
19, 2010, the Senate voted to end the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy.” This
is precedent setting in that neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate held hearings to assess the impact of Section 654’s rescindment in its
entirety. Unfortunately, despite its title, “Policy Concerning Homosexuality
in the Armed Forces,” the section contains important military policy that
extends well beyond the narrow issue of homosexual eligibility for military
service. The repeal of those provisions will radically change the American
system of military justice and discipline. Congress failed to wait on the
Department of Defense’s report regarding the repeal of Section 654. Thus,
the report will have no power to mitigate the effects, because to restore or
retain portions of Section 654 is to argue against the repeal and reveal that
its repeal is improvident. With the repeal, the US military services will enter
a litigious period of indiscipline.
To understand why repealing Section 654 will radically alter the
system of military justice and discipline, it is first necessary to examine the
Section 654 findings. The findings were not only drawn from the testimony
presented in the hearings before the House Armed Services Committee in
1993 but also from appellate and Supreme Court rulings on matters of military law. Congress appended the findings to ensure that the policy enacted
in 1993 would withstand constitutional challenge and based the findings
on Congress’s exclusive constitutional power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Repealing those findings
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will mean that military courts will no longer be able to rely on those legal
precedents as guides for the governance of the armed forces. Because those
findings describe the principles that have governed the order and discipline
of the military since the US civil war, the meaning of good order will be
erased. That is why those findings need to be carefully reviewed.
There are fifteen findings listed in Section 654, among which only
two, 13 and 15, directly refer to the issue of homosexuality. Finding 12
refers to living conditions during deployments and can be reasonably connected to 13 and 15. Two findings, 1 and 3, merely restate the power granted
to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 to regulate the armed forces.
The repeal will have no effect on those powers. Five findings discuss in
general terms military service. Finding 4 states the primary purpose of the
armed forces; Finding 5 recognizes the need for personal sacrifice; the need
for good order and discipline is recalled in Finding 6; and Finding 7 cites
the importance of cohesion to military effectiveness. The remaining six
findings, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14, are key, because they define the principles
that underlie the established system of military justice and order. Absent
these principles, most, if not all, policy regarding selection, retention, and
discipline are subject to legal challenge or reinterpretation.2
The significance of the six key findings cannot be overstated. They
have been the subject of various military policy debates throughout the
history of the United States.3 Consequently, these six findings represent a
clear contemporary exercise of congressional authority and a clear definition of the military order the Congress intends. First among them is Finding
8, which has two parts. Finding 8 states that military life is fundamentally
different from civilian life; the military exists as a specialized society, and
one that has not only its own rules but also restrictions on personal behavior
that would be intolerable in civilian society. In other words, rights and privileges enjoyed by the citizens of the United States can be and are denied to
members of the military. Many of the restrictions are justified in terms of the
need for civilian control or the maintenance of military efficiency; however,
it is important to observe that neither Congress nor the military, when acting
under authority granted by Congress, needs to prove that the restrictions are
necessary or effective. Many Americans might believe the separate character of military society is obvious, but that conclusion is not at all obvious.
The organizations of European armed forces differ greatly from that of the
United States, and some nations have no equivalent to the Uniformed Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ).4 Removing this finding does not create major
changes in military order but does open a wide variety of challenges to the
current order, a topic that will be addressed later in this article.
The finding that the military is a separate society possessing its own
rules does not define the extent of those rules, although Congress did specify
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how far those rules extend. Findings 9 and 10 bind the servicemember to the
standards of conduct of the armed forces for 24 hours each day beginning
the moment an individual enters
military status and at all places—
With the repeal, the US military
on or off base and on or off duty.
services will enter a litigious
These findings embrace the posiperiod of indiscipline.
tion taken by the US Supreme
Court in Solorio v. United States
(1987). In that case, the Supreme Court overturned a previous Supreme
Court decision, O’Callahan v. Parker (1969), stating that military status
alone makes the servicemember subject to military jurisdiction.5 The decision in O’Callahan had restricted military jurisdiction to only offenses that
were service connected and made the maintenance of discipline particularly
difficult in the post-Vietnam period.6 O’Callahan’s effect on discipline will
be discussed later in greater deal. More than 23 years since O’Callahan was
overturned, few, if any, active officers recall how difficult it was to adhere
to the jurisdictional rules and still maintain discipline. The Congress, if it
intends to maintain military discipline in the manner it has come to expect,
would be well-advised to rethink the repeal of this finding.
Last among the key findings, but at the top of the list, is the declaration in Finding 2 that there is no right to serve. The declaration is a condition
for the announcement in Finding 14 that the armed forces need to maintain
personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces
would create an unacceptable risk to good order and discipline. Read strictly
in the context of Section 654’s title, the finding appears directed at justifying
the exclusion of homosexuals. Yet it pertains to all military selection criteria
based on any personal behaviors, from a servicemember’s misdemeanor
arrest record to a sleepwalking disorder. A survey of military selection criteria over the course of the last century reveals frequent efforts to expand
eligibility and broaden waiver policies with little evidence that those who
benefited from the changes proved suitable for military service.7 The finding
is important, because it permits the military to define selection policies for
classes of persons without having to demonstrate that a particular person in
the class is not suitable for military service. For example, the military does
not permit 16-year-olds to enlist even though the United States once permitted them to and, clearly, not all the 16-year-old enlistees served poorly.8 This
example is not intended to suggest that the military services will be beset
by challenges to underage enlistment rules. Rather the example illustrates
that enlistment and commissioning eligibility standards, even those that are
seemingly obvious, have been held constitutionally lawful without a showing
of evidence that those persons denied access to military service would prove
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unfit or unsuitable. Thus, the military can exclude persons based on criteria
that apply to a class of persons without being discriminatory.
A review of the preceding discussion of the Section 654 findings
reveals three dimensions defining what the Congress has declared as essential elements of military order and discipline. First, the military constitutes
a specialized society characterized by its own rules, many of which restrict
personal behavior. Second, persons who join the armed forces are subject
to those rules 24 hours each day beginning when that person enters military
status, and the standards of the UCMJ apply at all times and in all places.
Lastly, the Congress may exclude anyone from military service, especially
those who represent a risk to the standards of conduct or performance. Those
who have championed the lifting of the ban on homosexuals have argued
that none of these dimensions is required to establish an effective military
organization. Many foreign nations’ militaries are simply not organized in
this manner. Thus, the proponents for rescinding Section 654 can argue that
its rescindment will have no effect on good order and discipline. But, the US
military has already tested that proposition; the results were indiscipline and
disorder. In O’Callahan, the US Supreme Court ruled that military status
alone was not sufficient to establish military jurisdiction over an offense. In
Solorio, the Supreme Court overturned the O’Callahan ruling, which constitutes the substance of Findings 9 and 10. Consequently, the period when
the O’Callahan ruling applied, June 2, 1969, to June 24, 1987, provides a
record of the impact of eliminating military status as a basis for military
jurisdiction. That period also contains a record of challenges to military
rules and provides a good indicator of the difficulties the military services
will face as they try to preserve good order.
The details of the military crimes charged in the cases of Sergeant
James F. O’Callahan and Richard Solorio contain important similarities.
SGT O’Callahan was stationed at Fort Shaftner, Hawaii, in July 1956. On
the night of July 20, 1956, SGT O’Callahan, while on an evening pass in
Honolulu and wearing civilian clothes, broke into a hotel room, assaulted a
young girl, and attempted to rape her. The city police apprehended him and on
learning that he was in the armed forces turned him over to military authorities. He was charged accordingly with violation of Articles 80, 130, and 134
of the UCMJ, tried by court-martial, convicted on all counts, and sentenced.
The Army Board of Military Review and the US Court of Military Appeals
affirmed his sentence and a US District Court denied his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Subsequently, the US Supreme Court accepted his petition and overturned his military conviction on the grounds that the military
lacked jurisdiction.9 Much of the court’s reasoning in the O’Callahan case
is not relevant to the discussion here. Writing for the court, Justice William
O. Douglas observed that military courts did not provide the constitutional
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protections offered by civilian courts. He further argued that because British
law (prior to the American Revolution) prohibited court-martialing soldiers
who committed crimes recognized by civilian courts. US servicemembers
were entitled to the same protection under the US Constitution.10 Hence, a
servicemember is only subject to the provisions of UCMJ if the offense is
service connected or occurred where there was no US civilian court. Justice
Harlan, in the dissenting opinion, observed that the Constitution granted to
Congress exclusive power to govern the armed forces and, in his reading of
the law, had made military status alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction.11
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Solorio cites Justice Harlan’s dissent.
The case of Petty Officer Richard Solorio, heard February 24, 1987,
also involves sexual assault occurring off post in a civilian area. PO Solorio
was on active duty in the Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau,
Alaska, when he sexually abused two daughters of a fellow coastguardsman. Coast Guard authorities learned of the Alaska crimes only after he
was transferred to Governors Island, New York, where investigation into
the charges revealed that he had also committed similar acts there. The
Governors Island commander convened a general court-martial to try the
alleged crimes in both Alaska and New York. The military trial judge in
charge of the court-martial dismissed the charges from Alaska, ruling the
charges were not sufficiently service connected. The US Coast Guard Court
of Military Review reversed the trial judge’s order; the US Court of Military
Appeals affirmed the Court of Military Review’s reasoning that there was
sufficient service connection, even though the victims were civilian and the
crimes were not committed on post.12 Subsequently, the US Supreme Court
heard the case.
By applying some tortured reasoning, both courts of military review,
concluded Solorio’s offenses were service connected. The Supreme Court
justices unanimously agreed that the military had jurisdiction but four justices found no need to overturn O’Callahan. The court majority, however,
observed that the Court in O’Callahan had departed from the military status
test and announced a “new constitutional principle” that a military tribunal
may not try a servicemember charged with a crime that has no service connection.13 In Solorio, the court majority determined the O’Callahan decision
had neither paid sufficient deference to Clause 14 in Article I of the US
Constitution nor proper attention to the statutory evolution of US military
law. Thus, the Solorio Court found Congress had firmly established in law
that military status was sufficient to determine military jurisdiction.14 The
immediate effect of the Solorio decision was the end of a jumble of arcane
rules that every commander had to apply to sort out jurisdiction. The Solorio
opinion cited the numerous categories of offenses requiring special analysis
and the resulting confusion those rules created among the courts. Given that
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the findings in Solorio are found in Section 654, the Congress, by rescinding
it, affirmatively removes military status as the sole basis for jurisdiction. It
returns the military to the O’Callahan rules with one important exception; it
eliminates, or at least brings into question, the merits of military legal precedents. Military courts will have no legal history to guide their decisions.
As was the case in 1969, servicemembers will challenge aspects of
the UCMJ and military regulations. The O’Callahan decision essentially
divided a servicemember into two persons, a civilian when not involved in
actions that were service related and a servicemember subject to UCMJ and
military regulations. Thus, some challenges will assert a servicemember’s
right as a citizen to engage in certain conduct; some challenges will deny
the military’s right to regulate particular behavior. If those challenges fail,
the servicemember will argue the military does not have the jurisdiction
to take notice of the behavior and, therefore, is powerless to enforce the
rules it has made. Even more important will be the decisions made by individual commanders about whether they have the authority to investigate
alleged offenses or make rules within their units. This will be a problem
that will vex superior and subordinate commanders alike, and perhaps even
Congress. Many commanders may simply look the other way. The perfect
example of this problem is the political and military reaction to the Tailhook
91 incident in 1991.
A number of people will recall the coarser details of the Tailhook 91
incident. The Tailhook Association held its 35th Annual Symposium at the
Las Vegas Hilton Hotel from September 5 through 7, 1991. Initially started
in 1956 to reunite naval aviators, the annual Tailhook Symposium eventually expanded to include a number of professional development activities
that received official support from the Department of the Navy. The symposiums were well-known for their general rowdiness and wild parties to
which Tailhook 91 was no exception. On Saturday night, September 7,
1991, a gauntlet of drunken officers assaulted Lieutenant Paula Coughlin in
the hotel’s third-floor hallway. Her report of the incident ultimately led to a
criminal investigation and congressional hearings on gender discrimination
in the military.15 The incident occurred after the decision in Solorio, thus,
there was no problem establishing military jurisdiction. Under O’Callahan
rules, her personal complaint would not have posed any jurisdictional problems because her assailants were also Navy officers; however, it is doubtful
the Navy could have investigated reports from civilian women who were
also assaulted given that the offenses occurred in a civilian location and
the assailants were on leave or off duty. More importantly, it is unclear
if the Navy would have had any jurisdiction over offenses to other provisions of UCMJ. The DOD Inspector General’s report criticizes the Naval
Investigative Service’s (NIS) failure to investigate information concerning

6Parameters

The Death of Military Justice

indecent exposure (Article 134) and conduct unbecoming an officer (Article
133).16 There might have been a civil criminal code against indecent exposure, but it would not have been under a general article for all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces. Certainly, there is not a civilian equivalent for conduct unbecoming an officer. Thus, the Inspector General’s complaint that offenses against
Articles 133 and 134 were neglected would have been meaningless under
O’Callahan rules. It would have been completely irrelevant had Parker v.
Levy (1974) been decided differently.
Parker was decided on June 19, 1974, and was an attack on Articles
133 and 134 of UCMJ. In that case, the petitioning officer was Captain
Howard Levy, a physician, whose duty it was to train Special Forces medics
for service in Vietnam. He refused to train the medics because it violated his
medical ethics. CPT Levy believed that “special forces personnel are liars
and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of women and children.”
He made public statements to enlisted personnel that it was wrong for the
United States to be involved in the Vietnam War and encouraged colored
(sic) soldiers to refuse to fight in Vietnam. He was tried and convicted of violating Article 90, disobeying a lawful order, and Articles 133 and 134. The
US Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on Articles 133
and 134, holding that those articles were unconstitutionally vague. The Court
of Appeals held that, as measured by contemporary standards of vagueness
applicable to statutes and ordinances governing civilians, the general articles
do not pass constitutional muster. The Court concluded that, because the
violation involved speech protected by the First Amendment, the petitioner
would have standing to challenge both articles.17 Had the decision of the
Third Circuit Court prevailed in 1974, there would have been no need for the
Navy to concern itself with conduct unbecoming an officer at Tailhook 91.
Fortunately, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, cited numerous precedents that recognized the military as “a specialized society separate
from civilian society.” He also stated, “We have also recognized that the
military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own
during its long history.”18 Addressing the Court of Appeals’ concern for Dr.
Levy’s right to free speech, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.19
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Thus, Parker limited the effect of O’Callahan but recognized that
the servicemember did share some of the First Amendment protections
enjoyed by civilians. Nevertheless, the needs of the military community
to maintain order permitted restrictions that would be otherwise prohibited in civil society. Unfortunately, if the text in Parker is compared with
Section 654 Finding 8, it is obvious that rescinding Section 654 overturns the
Parker ruling.
Even more disturbing is the similarity between the actions of CPT
Levy and those of Major Malik Nadal Hasan. Like CPT Levy, MAJ Hasan
was a physician whose duty it was to prepare medical personnel for service
in Iraq, rather than Vietnam. Like CPT Levy, he objected to US involvement in a war he disagreed with and voiced those objections during his
medical presentations. Unlike CPT Levy, MAJ Hasan’s superiors did not
prefer court-martial charges against him. He was advanced to the rank of
major and assigned to duty at Fort Hood with subsequent duty in Iraq or
Afghanistan. At Fort Hood, he murdered 13 servicemembers and wounded
29 others. In the aftermath of the shootings, everyone, including Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates, wondered why MAJ Hasan had not been disciplined
or separated. In November 2009, Secretary Gates created an independent
review of the Fort Hood events led by former Secretary of the Army Togo
West and retired Admiral Vern Clark. Their task was to determine whether
policies or procedural weaknesses make the military more vulnerable to
attack. Unsurprisingly, the report concluded that the policies were generally
adequate but that several officers failed to comply with them when taking
actions regarding MAJ Hasan. The report noted that some medical officers
based their evaluations solely on MAJ Hasan’s academic performance. His
evaluation should have included observations of his total performance as
an officer, academic and nonacademic.20 That recommendation is certainly
consistent with current military law. Current law does not separate the servicemember into two persons—a private citizen and a public active duty
officer. Unfortunately, since Section 654 was rescinded, the military will
not have authority to assess an officer’s conduct if it does not occur in his
or her place of duty. Servicemembers will assert that behaviors, including
speech, that occur outside the duty place are beyond military jurisdiction.
The rules are likely to resemble those found on US public universities where
academic authorities are not permitted to assess conduct not directly related
to the classroom. Consequently, the military will revisit the manifold challenges to discipline and good order occasioned by the O’Callahan decision
in 1969.
While it is impossible to predict which rules will ultimately be challenged, it is certain that military restrictions on personal behavior will be
attacked first. The most frequently ruled upon category of military offenses
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in the O’Callahan period involved the use of illegal drugs. There is no doubt
that a servicemember in California will avail himself of the local right to
obtain and use medical marijuana. He will also assert that the command
lacks the authority, absent probable cause, to require him to provide a urine
specimen. Following O’Callahan, the US Military Court of Appeals ruled
in United States v. Beeker that “the use or possession of marihuana was
service connected because the use or possession . . . of marihuana and
narcotics has a special military significance since their use has ‘disastrous
effects on the health, morale and fitness for duty of persons in the armed
forces.’”21 Not all federal courts, however, agreed with that ruling and the
Court of Military Appeals renounced the decision seven years later, holding
that O’Callahan and Relford v. Commandant22 mandated the conclusion
that off base drug offenses committed by a servicemember could not be
tried by court-martial.23 Likewise, the military can expect manifold challenges to rules governing sexual conduct and fraternization. In 1997, when
First Lieutenant Kelly Flynn was charged by the Air Force for having a
sexual affair with a junior enlistee’s civilian husband and disobeying an
order to end it, many members of Congress found the Air Force’s position
out of touch with reality.24 The same reaction occurred in December 2009,
when members of Congress learned that Major General Tony Cucolo had
published a general order promising to punish any female servicemember
who became pregnant and the male servicemember who was responsible for
the pregnancy. Though the order was consistent with long-standing military
practice that a servicemember cannot render himself or others unfit for their
duties, feminists in Congress, criticized the policy as being contrary to the
basic rights of individual servicemembers.25 There is no doubt that following the rescission of Section 654 many servicemembers will claim their
individual rights are protected from military rules.
Article 64 of the American Articles of War of 1874 states, “The
officers and soldiers . . . mustered and in the pay of the United States shall,
at all times in all places, be governed by the articles of war, and shall be
subject to be tried by courts-martial.”26 Those words differ little from the
words in Finding 9, Section 654 of the US Code. That rule has continuously governed military discipline since 1874, with the painful exception
of the O’Callahan period, 1969 to 1987. Justice Douglas’s attempt to
impose a new constitutional principle on military law proved unworkable.
Nevertheless, some members of Congress now want to set aside US military precedent and follow foreign military practice, making servicemembers
only “sometime soldiers.” It is not possible here to assess the prospects for
maintaining military discipline in this ill-defined new order. What the three
major military cases discussed in this article show is that in no case did more
than five Supreme Court Justices agree on a legal position. In the cases that
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upheld military jurisdiction and limitations on servicemembers’ constitutional rights, the Court relied on the Congress’ authority to govern the armed
forces and define the principles upon which military order and discipline are
based. Rescinding Section 654 sets aside those principles without defining
new rules to take their place. It is, therefore, not idle speculation that the
armed forces is about to enter a period of confusion and disorder.
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